In the period of "new" imperialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, France strived to create a sphere of influence in southwest China. To foster such imperialist policies, France's policy makers regarded French companies operating in East Asia as instrumental. One such firm was Auguste Raphael Marty's Tonkin Shipping Company, based in Haiphong, French Indochina, which operated steam coasters across the wider Gulf of Tonkin region. In the region's highly competitive shipping market, Marty strived to achieve a monopoly when favorable conditions permitted during the final phase of the Sino-Japanese War. His profit-driven strategy caused huge losses for Chinese shippers and ultimately resulted in their boycotting his ships through the Tsap Yet syndicate. When French officials intervened on Marty's behalf in negotiations with the Chinese government, the Syndicate was finally dissolved. It was followed by an agreement between the Chinese firm of Yuen Cheong Lee and Co. and the German firm of Jebsen and Co., based on long-established mutual trust between the owners. Although Marty received monetary compensation for his losses, he ruined his relationship with Chinese merchants. This case study presents little-known facts about the interactions among foreign firms in China and demonstrates the Chinese ability to react efficiently to unfair business practices.
Scholars of Chinese business history have pointed out that, from 1860 to 1895, coastal and riverine shipping was the most important Western economic activity in China. However, Western steam coasters predominantly depended on Chinese merchants' charters to transport bulk goods along the China coast, on its rivers, and between China and other ports in East Asia (Osterhammel 1989, 183) . This was the field of business in which Chinese and foreigners started to "cooperate closely, both in the capitalisation of the shipping concerns and in the organisation of the services" (Allen and Donnithorne 1954, 131-132) . Such practices were common in the treaty ports when Chinese merchants began investing in Western companies, starting in the 1870s. Economic historian David Faure has indicated that "possibly 70 percent of all Western shipping was financed by Chinese merchants." He concludes: "There can be little doubt that the bulk of this investment went through trusts that had been established via private channels" (Faure 2006, 51) . The overall result of this practice was impressive: at the end of the nineteenth century, around 40 percent of the capital of Western firms in China-mainly active in shipping, banking, and cotton weaving, and to a lesser extent in insurance and manufacturing industries-was in Chinese hands, and Chinese merchants had become board members of numerous Western jointstock companies (Osterhammel 1989, 188 By presenting a case study in the wider context of business history in modern China, this article aims to develop a more differentiated picture of the spectrum of relations between foreign and Chinese firms on the level of material connections-in this case, shipping-and on the level of business culture (in this case, networks of trust). Based on archival evidence, this article demonstrates that a long-established sense of mutual trust between a Chinese and a Western firm was the precondition for close business cooperation. Such an association was established in 1896 between the Chinese firm Yuen Cheong Lee and Co. and the German firm Jebsen and Co. in the form of a joint agreement on the organization of tramp shipping services. That such a partnership was a rare combination at the time, even in Hong Kong, is confirmed in a private letter written by one of the German partners. The establishment of this partnership should be considered in the overall political context of heightened imperialist rivalries in China, and especially France's endeavors to create a sphere of interest in southwest China. To escape political pressure from both the French and Chinese governments, Chinese merchants entered a somewhat exceptional agreement with a German firm that was based primarily on mutual interest and trust.
Three main topics will be discussed in this article. This case demonstrates that the rather harmonious Sino-French relations in the period from 1895 to 1898-but particularly France's ambition for political and economic influence in southwest China-were crucial in providing Marty with strong support. It also shows that the Chinese and, at a later stage, German governments were prepared to tacitly accept the preponderance of Second, Marty's profit-driven aspirations toward his main customers-Chinese merchants in Pakhoi and Hoihow shipping cargoes on foreign merchant steamers-severely harmed his business relations with them. His temporary monopoly in the market, which permitted him to fix freights at high rates, led to the establishment of the Chinese syndicate Tsap Yet (1895-1896), which boycotted his ships. In 1897, with French political backing, Marty succeeded in gaining financial compensation for his losses from the Chinese government, which recovered the sum from affected merchants through local authorities. The twofold damage to Chinese merchants caused by Marty's actions greatly damaged the French shipowner's reputation as a businessman. It is evident that foreign businesses in China backed by their own governments were able to make considerable short-term financial gains in the form of monetary compensation, but at the same time risked losing their Chinese client base when they were regarded as using unfair practices.
Third, the agreement on shipping services between the Chinese shipping company Yuen Cheong Lee and Co. and the German firm Jebsen and Co. arose in reaction to the interference of French and Chinese authorities in the shipping market. It made up for the prohibition of the Tsap Yet Syndicate by presenting an example of a partnership built on mutual trust. Such an association was possible only because both partners knew each other from many years of doing business. In order to escape political pressure, Chinese businesspeople were prepared to cooperate closely with a foreign firm. As outlined above, this partnership seems to have been rather unusual at the time.
The case study presented here describes an almost unknown episode in the history of France's presence in China and in East Asia, and particularly in China's political, economic, and maritime history.
1 The reasons why it is so little known are probably twofold: first, as British interests in Hong Kong were not directly involved, there is hardly any documentation in Hong
Kong government files or in English newspapers 2 ; second, French and German government files appear to have rarely been consulted by historians working on the business or economic history of China.
The bulk of the material used for this article came from the Political Archives of the German Foreign Office (Berlin), which houses Chinese records of the boycott and its aftermath 
France's New Expansionist Policy in China
In the nineteenth century, France's foreign policy in the Far East was deeply influenced by its imperialist rivalry with Britain. National prestige played an important role when the French navy began operating in Far Eastern waters starting in the 1830s, mainly concerned with protecting Catholic missionaries due to the lack of any French commercial interests to safeguard. In the mid-1880s, French foreign policy in the Far East took a decisively aggressive turn.
Following the Sino-French War of 1884-1885, the Treaty of Tientsin (June 9, 1885) required China to give up its sovereignty over Annam and to accept a French protectorate over it. The protectorate of Annam and Tonkin was an important geopolitical change resulting in the permanent establishment of France at the border of southwest China. The main attraction of the Chinese provinces bordering Tonkin was their allegedly large and prosperous population, which constituted a potentially important market for French industry (Cady 1967, 29-38; Lee 1989, 12-15; Brötel 1996, 223-340; Hsü 2000, 189-192 The next major turning point came ten years later. With the dismissal of German chancellor Otto von Bismarck (1890), the growing alliance between France and Russia (1893-1894) , and the favorable economic situation, French policy makers came to a broad consensus on foreign policy issues, including colonial expansion (Stuart 1921, 5; Lee 1989, 141-173; Brötel 1996, 341-362; Hsü 2000, 325-330; Tixier 2008, 74-75; Bensacq-Tixier 2008, 309-313) .
The new expansionist policy was embodied in the diplomat Auguste Gérard (1852 Gérard ( -1922 , who arrived in Peking in April 1894 to begin a vigorous, sometimes even aggressive, term as French minister in the Chinese capital (figure 2). The new minister was a highly politically minded person, having served in 1881-1882 as cabinet chief under Prime Minister Léon Gambetta, the proclaimer of the French Republic in 1870. In his memoirs Gérard wrote that his first obligation was to preserve and maintain all rights, concessions, advantages, and privileges that France had acquired since her first treaty with China in 1844. Charged with developing
France's commercial interests in China, Gérard undertook an important economic mission (Gérard 1918, xxi-xxiii) . Gérard's like-minded counterpart and chief in Paris, Gabriel Hanotaux (1853 -1944 , began his first term as France's foreign minister a month after Gérard arrived in Peking (figure 3). Gérard later praised Hanotaux for taking to heart his China mission and outlining his plan of action with great care (Gérard 1918, vi) . The close interaction between the two French policy makers explains to a large extent the success of France's new offensive policy toward China from 1895 to 1898.
The earliest opportunity for offensive action came with China's military loss to Japan in 1895, the most important turning point in China's history in the nineteenth century (Osterhammel 1989, 126) . At the end of the Sino-Japanese War, China was forced to accept the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895), which included paying a huge war indemnity and ceding the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan. However, on Hanotaux's initiative, the so-called Tripartite Intervention of April 23, 1895 , by Russia, France, and Germany was staged, forcing Japan to return the Liaotung to China in consideration of a further 30 million taels' indemnity. All three intervening powers expected to be well compensated by the Chinese. (Lee 1989, 150-152; Osterhammel 1989, 204-205; Brötel 1996, 388-434; Bensacq-Tixier 2008, 311-318) . Figure 2 . Auguste Gérard (1852 Gérard ( -1922 . Figure 3 . Gabriel Hanotaux (1853 -1944 . Source: Gérard (1928, frontispiece) .
Source: Doubleday, Page and Company (1903, 3921 ). of the opening of China and an exclusively French date," because this railway concession was "the first one which had been granted by the Chinese government" to a foreign power (Brötel 1996, 456-466; Gérard 1918, 129-134) . Consequently, the minister wrote:
The work begun in 1885 with the Treaty of Tientsin came thus to an end ten years later under the most proper conditions, not only to protect the security of our Indochinese possessions against new perils but to make Indochina the most direct and shortest way of penetration toward the south and the west of the great Empire. (Gérard 1918, 66-67) However, as Gérard made clear, the principle of France's policy in East Asia was to maintain the integrity and independence of China. In return, as the minister explained, "China found herself linked for her own good, as for ours, to the politics of France and Russia . . . from the ratification of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (May 8, 1895) until the end of 1897" (Gérard 1918, 51-52, 54 commodities between the treaty ports on the China coast and link other port cities on the shores of the Southern Ocean (Otte 1930; Liu 1956 , Liu 1964 Becker 2010) .
In China, the right to engage in coastal shipping was given to the various treaty powers after the British Treaty of Tientsin in 1858. Since all treaty powers had a most-favored-nation arrangement with China in commercial conventions concluded after 1858, the right of cabotage was applied accordingly. However, coastal shipping went beyond the China Seas and closely connected northern maritime regions in Siberia and Japan with Southeast Asian regions in French Indochina, Malaysia, Singapore, Dutch East India, and the Philippines. In the main port cities of these regions, a combination of Western, Chinese, and local firms dealt with the regional and local import and export trade. Besides junks, small-and medium-sized steamships were frequently employed to connect the networks of commerce and finance in these regions. The British crown colony Hong Kong emerged as the most important port of call for intercontinental shipping lines and for all sorts of vessels employed in coastal shipping (Sze [1925 (Sze [ ] 1971 Tsai 1993, 23-26; Carroll 2005, 13, 33, 67-69; Meyer 2000, 83-87; Becker 2010, 249-250) .
Steamers engaged in coastal shipping were usually tramping, which was, as maritime historian Michael M. Miller explains, "a constant struggle to position ships where freight was abundant and competitors' ships were not, where rates therefore were high not low, where voyages contracted would not undercut arrival in time for seasonal trades, where going for a 'spot loading' was better than fixing a cargo in advance" (Miller 2012, 95) . The same conditions applied to East Asia, where highly competitive shipping markets were usually divided into two different types of charter markets, the trip (or voyage) charter market and the time charter market. Under the first type of contract, which was typical of tramp shipping, the charterer hired the ship for only one voyage to carry his cargo at an agreed rate per ton. Under the second type of contract, the shipowner provided the crew and all other requirements for operating the ship.
The charterer became the disponent owner and was allowed to send the vessel anywhere and load it with all kinds of merchandise. Under this type of contract, the charterer usually hired the ship at an agreed monthly rate over a period of three, six, or twelve months. The time charter option permitted the operation of regular lines in coastal shipping, something that was highly profitable when agricultural bulk cargoes (such as rice and other foodstuffs) were transported from agriculturally producing regions to consuming markets (e.g., from Burma, Siam, and French Indochina to Hong Kong and other major ports [Gipouloux (2009), 187-198; Becker (2010), 274-275; Becker (2012), 297-299, 317-319] However, an exceptional situation arose during the final phase of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), with the high demand for coasters to provide transport and supply provisions for Chinese troops. Chau's regular line between Hong Kong, Hoihow, and Pakhoi almost ended its operations after the shipowner moved his time-chartered vessels to other, more profitable routes Consequently, the French shipowner put four ships on the line: his own two steamers under the French flag and two chartered Danish vessels, the Frejr and the Activ. Furthermore, to make the most of his temporary monopoly, Marty drastically raised the freight rates for all shipments of passengers and cargo. The sudden increase in transportation costs caused heavy losses for Chinese shippers in the ports of call who had no alternative but to ship their merchandise on Marty's coasters. 11 The French shipowner's profit-driven business attitude caused a situation that provoked a strong reaction from the major Chinese commercial guilds at Hoihow and Pakhoi, whose principal goal was to watch over the commercial interests of its members; the reaction was a locally initiated boycott.
The Tsap Yet Syndicate
Boycotts were used by the Chinese from the 1840s to the 1930s in quarrels with foreign merchants over foreign goods. These boycotts targeted Japan, the United States, and Britain in particular, and a number of excellent studies (Morse 1909, 55-56; Liu 1956, 147-148; Remer 1966, 1-20; Tsai 1993, 182-237; Wong 2002) have examined the large boycott movements of the twentieth century, such as the 1905 anti-American boycott, which is usually seen as the beginning of this phenomenon. However, boycotting has a longer history in China, with local boycotts of the goods or merchants of a particular foreign nation, and, starting in 1842, there seem to have been occasional local boycotts of the merchants of certain countries. These early boycotts can be regarded as the weaponry of one of the most powerful and organized social groups in late Qing China, namely the Chinese merchant guilds. Guild members entered into agreements that involved ceasing to purchase or deal in goods, or abstaining to use ships of the boycotted country. Unlike the political boycotts that followed the 1905 anti-American boycott, local boycotts-often called "taboos" in English-language sources-were not directed against the ships of a particular nation, but against those of a particular company.
Confronted with an exceptionally unfavorable situation, the worst-hit Chinese guilds in Hoihow and Pakhoi reacted quickly to the crisis and, in the autumn of 1895, established the Co., German shipbrokers in Hong Kong, were agents. All partners of Tsap Yet were obliged to ship their cargo exclusively on the two vessels, according to the statutes, and the freight rates of the two syndicate steamers were set lower than Marty's.
12 With these arrangements, the boycott began. forcing the shippers to act thus. 21 During the approximately weeklong negotiations of the Sino-French commission, Gauthier proved to be strongly politically minded by ardently supporting Marty's damage claim of 100,000 taels for losses caused by Tsap Yet. He also demanded cancellation of the time charters of the two German coasters and a ban of any future shipping on these vessels. The
Chinese officials rejected such claims, pointing out that the German firm Schomburg and Co.
was the agent of the German steamers and thus it was a matter for the two rival French and German shipping companies to work out. 22 The Courrier d'Haiphong, a strong advocate of the French position, called the statement a "crude subterfuge" that would mislead no one. informing Chinese shippers that it was their free right to ship goods on whatever merchant vessel they desired. 26 Tan agreed and accordingly instructed Prefect Liu, who had the statement published at the end of January 1896. However, the prefect undermined his instructions by sending a messenger around the merchants in Pakhoi to pass by word of mouth that Chinese shippers were not allowed to ship on the two German steamers in question. 27 His counteraction coincided with the French decision to redispatch the Alouette to Pakhoi in early February 1896 in order to forcefully prevent the loading of the German vessels. In view of such constraints, the Pakhoi merchants gave in: the time charter of the Triumph was cancelled on February 1, 1896, and that of the Cosmopolit soon thereafter, resulting in huge contractual penalties for shippers. 28 It was clear that the merchants had yielded to the combined political and military pressures.
Sino-German Business Cooperation
The continuing crisis in the shipping market of southwest China caused by Marty's aspirations and France's interest in backing his business was an important factor in the fostering of French influence in the Gulf of Tonkin region, and it resulted in a noteworthy Sino-German business cooperation. The initiative came from Jebsen and Co. and its co-owner Jacob Jebsen (figure 7), who paid a personal visit to Pakhoi in early 1896 to discuss the situation with E. L. B.
Allen, the British consul in charge of German interests. Jebsen's correspondence from the time is silent on the subject; it appears the German shipowner wished to keep the issue confidential in The proclamation brought about the desired result: the Doris (figure 8) and the Triumph were soon charged with shipments of merchandise from Pakhoi merchants. Indeed, Jacob Jebsen could depend on the support of the Chinese for two reasons: First, it was evident to the shippers that the earlier crisis had been caused by Marty's attempt to exploit his temporary monopoly in the regional shipping market to their economic disadvantage. Second, it was also plain that the crisis had been exacerbated by the involvement of French officials, who observably had their own political intentions in mind when supporting the interests of the Tonkin Shipping Company.
There was a possibility that the French could again, and at any time, interfere with commercial freedom by applying pressure on the Chinese government and local Chinese authorities to ship goods on Marty's vessels. The best solution was to rely on a foreign shipping company that was -in contrast to Tsap Yet-immune from pressure from the Chinese and French authorities and was firmly backed by German consular staff in China in order to secure reliable shipments.
Therefore, Jebsen's idea was met with support but on the precondition that the arrangement should be in the form of a partnership with K. C. Chau, the former operator of the line. partnership of his company with Chau "was only based on personal trust to him." 35 Mutual interest, and especially mutual trust, were undoubtedly the basic propelling factors and the necessary preconditions for entering this business association. Such trust between people in economic exchanges has been described as having a mutual confidence that others will not exploit any adverse selection, moral hazard, holdup, or other vulnerabilities that might exist in a particular exchange. The existence of strong trust between partners is especially regarded as a source of competitive advantage when such a form is relatively rare among a set of competitors (Sabel 1993 (Sabel , 1133 Barney and Hansen 1994, 176, 188-189) . of their shared impression that K. C. Chau had "a rather isolated position among Chinese commercial circles in Hong Kong," Jebsen was not optimistic about establishing new business contacts through him. 36 The remark shows that K. C. Chau's partnership with Jebsen and Co.
was a relatively unusual association that set the Chinese firm apart from its competitors. On June 17, 1896, Gérard approached the Tsungli Yamen, maintaining that Tsap Yet was still in operation and demanding compensation of 100,000 taels for Marty. 41 In their reply, the Chinese ministers stressed that the Triumph's German nationality gave it the right to ship goods and passengers without the interference of the Tsungli Yamen. They also called Marty's claim "absurd" and advised the shipowner not to make Chinese merchants responsible for his unsuccessful business and to change strategies in order to make his company operate effectively. 42 Their resolute position caused Gérard to pay a personal visit to the Tsungli Yamen on August 17, 1896, where he found the ministers prepared only to send a special commissioner to Hoihow to investigate the matter (Chen 2008b).
In their meeting with the commissioner on October 26, 1896, the Hoihow merchants emphasized that the three steamers on the line were owned and operated by Jebsen and Co.
However, due to pressure from Peking's commissioner, they finally signed a guarantee pay the entire requested compensation, which had been fixed at about 760,000 Mexican dollars, to avoid any possible future claims from Marty. 48 Gérard took up the ball with the clear intention to settle the case permanently before ending his mission and returning to France a few months later (Gérard 1918, 239-240) . Judging the shipowner's final claim to be unreasonably high, the minister not only reduced the compensation to 200,000 taels but also ignored Marty's further capital claims, such as a request for extra promises or future guarantees. 49 Accordingly, Consul Kahn, in his meeting with the two prefects in Hoihow on April 14, 1897, fixed the compensation at 200,000 taels, and the agreement was signed on June 4, 1897. When Gérard and the Chinese ministers approved and ratified the deal in Peking on July 10, 1897, the case was closed for French policy makers. 
Germany's Diplomatic Nonintervention
Marty's considerable monetary gain concerned Jebsen and Co. greatly with regard to the preparedness of Chinese merchants to continue shipping their cargo on the firm's vessels.
Consequently, on July 6, 1897, Consul Dr. Ludwig von Loeper, being temporarily in charge of the German consulates both in Hong Kong and Canton, approached Viceroy Tan to issue a proclamation at Hoihow and Pakhoi, again stressing equal treatment for ships of all nations. 53 Although Tan complied, his instructions were ignored by local officials. At Hoihow his order was completely disregarded, and at Pakhoi, on August 17, 1897, the proclamation's text contradicted German interests, stating: "When shipping goods everyone must be treated equal, and a certain ship should not be picked out for loading." Upon later reading the original Chinese version, Knappe found that it forbade shippers to select a specific vessel and therefore meant just the opposite of giving freedom to use any ship for transport.
54
As a result of the ambiguous wording, Prefect Liu instructed Chinese merchants on pain of punishment not to give the larger part of their cargoes to Jebsen's ships. Furthermore, Chinese officials tried to recover from shippers a part of Marty's compensation. Under these threats Chinese firms in Pakhoi instructed their branches in Hong Kong not to give German vessels more cargo than French ones. Therefore, the three Jebsen coasters serving the line received less than half or no cargo at all from mid-August to early November 1897. 55 The new crisis led to reactions on several sides: first, Jebsen and Co., estimating its monthly losses to be at least 5,000 Mexican dollars, submitted on October 25, 1897, its first claim for damages to Consul Loeper, justifying this demand by declaring the actions of Chinese officials to be contrary to commercial liberty. Second, on October 26, 1897, a new proclamation was issued at Hoihow and Pakhoi clearly stating that shippers were free to use any ship for transporting cargo. Third, on the same day, Loeper appealed to Viceroy Tan, who accordingly gave orders so that the earlier announcement was followed up, on November 5 and 6, 1897, by two more proclamations reiterating the former's position. At that time the German minister was involved in intensive negotiations with the Chinese government about leasing Kiaochow with the intention of developing it into a Germanadministered naval and trading hub in China (Schrecker 1971, 43-58; Mühlhahn 2000, 107-110 
Conclusion
The case presented here highlights a historical moment during which political and economic rivalries among the treaty powers in China were so extreme as to merit multiple instances of interference into what might otherwise be considered the "private" realm of business. In the period of "new" imperialism in China and East Asia, France actively strived to create a sphere of influence in southwest China or in the wider Gulf of Tonkin region. In this context, the Haiphong-based Tonkin Shipping Company played an instrumental role in justifying In the context of rethinking business history in modern China, the case study presented here offers a more nuanced picture by highlighting two major themes:
First, the historical context-when imperialist rivalries in China reached a climax in terms of their effects on shipping business operations-needs to be taken into account. Chinese merchants showed themselves able to react efficiently concerning what they considered to be unfair business practices by a foreign firm. However, using the boycott as a political weapon was a strategy that proved successful only in the very short term, while close cooperation with another Western company was a better medium-and long-term strategy to escape political pressures from both the Chinese and foreign governments.
Second, mutual interest and long-established mutual trust between a Chinese and a German firm after many years of having done business together was without doubt the precondition to establishing close business cooperation. This was realized in the form of an agreement about joint organization of shipping services. That such a combination was regarded as unusual at the time is confirmed by hitherto unpublished archival evidence revealed in this case study. In this way, the case provides nuanced insights into the history of economic interaction between Chinese and foreign business in the late nineteenth century. 
Notes
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The only exceptions are journal articles by de Gantès (2004, 228) and Martinez (2007, 90) , in which the shipping rivalry between Marty and Jebsen in the 1890s is very briefly discussed based on documents from ANOM (Aix-en-Provence); however, the precise background and business connections between the firms involved remained unknown to the authors. (1940, (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) . Brief overviews of the firms' commercial activities in Indochina and China, and also in the local context of Haiphong as the French colony's major northern port, are available in Raffi (1994, 182-183) and Villemagne (2008, 699-701 and his business associate, Heinrich Jessen (1865 Jessen ( -1931 . Operating in East Asia, the Jebsen steamers were frequently chartered by Chinese companies to transport all kinds of cargo in coastal and interregional shipping. Jebsen and Co. Ltd., having started in 1895 as a shipping agency and general trading company, soon occupied a leading position in the foreign trade of China and Hong Kong. The early years of the Jebsen firms are dealt with in Hänisch (1970, 25-41) , Miller and Wasmuth (2008, 8-21) , Becker (2010) , and Becker (2012, 315-323, 576-578 Year 1917 Year (1917 : "No privileged commercial society shall henceforward be established in China, and the same shall apply to any organised coalition having for its end the exercise of a monopoly of trade. In case of the contravention of the present article the Chinese Authorities, on the representation of the Consul or Consular Agent, shall advise as to the means of dissolving such associations, of which they are also bound to prevent the existence by the preceding prohibitions, so as to remove all that may stand in the way of free competition." 16 "Auguste Gérard (Peking) to Augustin Juline Fourès (Hanoi), November 27, 1895 and December 23, 1895" (Folder 19925, ANOM) . 17
The new rules of Tsap Yet's head firm in Hong Kong called The Rules of the Chak Yik Steam-Ship Company were put in print, with one copy enclosed in the "Report of Camille
